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Overview
• A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space 
environment is the risk of failure from an impact from a 
meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle  
• An extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuit” impact 
during a US extravehicular activity (EVA) is of great 
concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from 
safely reaching the airlock in time resulting in a loss of life  
• A risk assessment is provided to the EVA office at the 
Johnson Space Center (JSC) by the Hypervelocity Impact 
Technology (HVIT) group prior to certification of readiness 
for each US EVA
• Need to understand the effect of updated meteoroid and 
orbital debris environment models to EMU risk
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EVA Risk Assessment Methodology
EVA Timeline Risk Assessment Flowchart 
<; ~ 
I ,~ l ', l q.>c>' T I c;, ( r _J ~ 
155 Operating Parameters 
on Planned Date of EVA 
Stand Alone 
Environment Models 
Current : ORDEM3.0, M EM R2 
Future: ORDEM3. l , M EM-3 
Key: 
Extravehicular Mobility 
Unit (EMU) Geometry 
EMU Finite 
Element Model 
Timel ine Analysis FEM 
with 155 Shadowing 
HVIT (Johnson Space Cent er) 
Orbital Debris Program Office (NASA-JSC) 
Meteoroid Environment Offi ce (NASA-MSFC) 
EVA Program Office (NASA-JSC) 
EVA Worksite Locations 
and Durations 
MMOD Environment 
Enhancement Factors 
Present Failure Odds 
Cert ificat ion of EVA Readiness 
Review (CoER2) 
Failure 
Criteria 
Hypervelocity Test 
and Analysis 
Equations 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
4
EMU Finite Element Model (FEM)
• A detailed finite element model (FEM) of the EMU was 
created with regions for the various shielding 
configurations
• 42 different surface property ID (PID) types representing 
the different shielding configurations
• Two main groups of 
shielding configurations:  
1. Soft goods:
• TMG over a pressure garment
• maintains the acceptable 
atmospheric environment for the 
astronaut
2. Hard goods: 
• TMG (except for helmet) over 
metallic, composite and/or plastic 
components.
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EMU FEM Continued<; ~ 
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Ballistic Limit Equations
• EMU thermal meteoroid garment (TMG) performs as a 
mini bumper shield
– Ortho-fabric layers induce a shock pulse that breaks up the projectile and 
creates an expanding debris cloud
– Inner layers (MLI and ripstop) and the pressure garment restraint layer help 
with further particle breakup and create spacing for the debris cloud to 
expand before reaching the bladder or underlying critical component      
EMU Basic Soft Goods BLE
Normal - 0° Impacts
Ref: Christiansen, E.L., Cour-Palais, B.G., and Friesen, L.J., 1998. “Extravehicular Activity Suit Penetration Resistance” 
Proceedings of the 1998 Hypervelocity Impact Symposium, International Journal of Impact Engineering, Vol. 23.
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EMU Failure Modes
• The risk of a meteoroid or orbital debris particle 
penetrating the thermal meteoroid garment (TMG) and 
the pressure garment is determined for two failure 
modes:
1. Perforation threshold (EVA abort): any size leak risk of the bladder 
layer of the pressure garment
2. Critical hole size threshold (catastrophic leak): uncontrolled leak risk 
caused by a >4mm hole in the bladder
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EVA Timeline Analysis
• EVA office provides a summary of EMU positions (including body 
orientation) for the specific EVA worksite locations on the 
International Space Station (ISS), and the duration at each location
– using detailed EVA summaries/presentations and/or EVA training run videos 
from the Neutral Buoyancy Lab (NBL)
• Timeline analysis FEMs are built by orienting an EMU FEM at each 
worksite location on a simplified ISS FEM. When one or more 
worksites require multiple body orientations, additional analysis 
FEMs are built.
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Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Models
• Meteoroid models (provided by MSFC Meteoroid 
Environment Office): 
– MEM R2 – previous meteoroid environment model used from 2014 
through August 2019 
• All meteoroids assumed to be 1.0 g/cm3
– MEM 3 – latest released meteoroid environment model and used in 
EVA risk assessments starting in August 2019 
• Meteoroid density in two distributions (low-density and high-density) with 
density varying from 0.125 g/cm3 up to 7.975 g/cm3
• Orbital debris models (provided by JSC Orbital Debris 
Program Office):
– ORDEM 3.0 – current approved debris model
– ORDEM 3.1 – new debris model not yet released
• Risk assessments provided here are preliminary, for indication only (may be 
changed after ORDEM 3.1 is finalized and released)
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Meteoroid Model Comparison
MEMR2 to MEM-3
• MEM-3 meteoroid environment model contributes 71% more risk
(any size leak penetration) than MEM-R2
• Risk difference is attributable to the addition of high density 
populations to the MEM-3 meteoroid environment
• Softgoods shielding configuration accounts for 89% of the risk 
difference
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Orbital Debris Model Comparison
ORDEM 3.0 vs. ORDEM 3.1
• ORDEM 3.1 environment model contributes 13% less risk of (any 
size leak penetration) than ORDEM 3.0
• 99.7% of this risk difference comes from the high and medium 
density populations
• Softgoods shielding configuration accounts for 72% of the risk 
difference
PRELIMINARY
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Combined MMOD Comparison
• 11% more cumulative MMOD penetration risk for MEM-3  
and ORDEM 3.1 versus MEMR2 and ORDEM 3.0
– Risk decrease from ORDEM 3.1 orbital debris environment offset by 
risk increase from MEM-3 meteoroid environment
• 78% of the OD3.1/MEM-3 risk is in the softgoods
shielding configuration regions  
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MMOD Risk odds for typical EVA 
(6.5 hour duration, 2 crew)
• MMOD risks are relatively small for typical ISS EVAs, no 
matter what environment models are used
– Example only, MMOD risks vary by location, duration, year of EVA, 
and other factors
Failure Mode
MMOD Risk Odds
MEM R2 and ORDEM 3.0 MEM 3 and ORDEM 3.1
Any size leak 1 in 5,000 1 in 4,500
Critical leak 1 in 28,000 1 in 26,000
<; ~ 
I ,~ l ', l q.>c>' T I c;, ( r _J ~ 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
14
Conclusions
• Assessed the change in risk using updated MMOD 
environment models (MEM-3 and ORDEM 3.1)
– 11% more cumulative MMOD penetration risk due to risk increase 
from high-density component of MEM-3
• Soft goods regions of the EMU continue to drive risk, 
contribute 78% of cumulative MMOD penetration risk
• MMOD risks remain small for typical 6.5 hour EVA, no 
matter what MMOD environments are used
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